

AMANNEE



CONTENTS

AMANNEE

JANUARY 2003

NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR ARRIVES IN GHANA	3
ALLIES, FRIENDS, AND PARTNERS ON EVERY PAGE: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY By Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State.	4
AFRICA: A TOP POLICY PRIORITY IN THE NEW BUSH STRATEGY PLAN By James Fisher-Thompson, Washington File Staff Writer.	6
POWELL LAUNCHES MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE	9
FACT SHEET OUTLINES U.S.-MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE	12
IRAQ: FROM FEAR TO FREEDOM	13
WHAT DOES DISARMAMENT LOOK LIKE?	16
PICTURES IN REVIEW	19
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: A NEW ERA Bibliography and key Internet sites.	21
UPCOMING TRADE EVENTS IN THE U.S.	22
COMMERCIAL NEWS USA	23

COVER PHOTO: Dr. Sam Swan (left), with some of the participants at the TV Training workshop, held at the National Film and Television Institute (NAFTI), Accra. (See story on page 19.)

Editorial Team

DAVID A. QUEEN - Director, Public Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy

MARY DASCHBACH - Information Officer, Public Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy

JONATHAN TEI TEKPETEY - Graphic Artist, Public Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy

MAILING ADDRESS - P.O. Box 2288, Accra Fax: 229882 Tel: 229179/229829/230571/2

NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR ARRIVES IN GHANA

Mary Carlin Yates was confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Ghana on November 15 2002, and served as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Burundi from 1999 until June 2002. She arrived in Ghana on January 1, 2003. Prior to her service in Burundi, she was assigned to the U.S. Embassy, Paris, as Senior Cultural Attaché, preceded by a tour as Press Attaché for Ambassador Pamela Harriman. She is a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister Counselor, who began her diplomatic career in 1980.

Her other assignments included Office Director in the Bureau of Public Affairs of East Asia and Pacific Affairs at the Department of State; Assistant Information Officer and Spokesperson for the U.S./Philippine Military Bases Talks in the Philippines; and, in Korea, Branch Public Affairs Officer in Kwangju. She has earned the USIA Lois Roth Award for Excellence in Information and Cultural Diplomacy, three Superior Honor Awards and a Meritorious Honor Award.

A native of Portland, Oregon, Ms. Yates earned her BA in English from Oregon State University and a Master's in Comparative East West Humanities from New York University (NYU), where she pursued her doctoral studies in Asian Affairs. Her languages are French and Korean.



Mary Carlin Yates

*She is married to a fellow Foreign Service Officer, John Melvin Yates, who recently retired after his last tour as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon and concurrently to the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.****

Allies, Friends, and Partners on Every Page: International Cooperation in The National Security Strategy

By Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State



“September 11th was a devastating day in American and world history, but perhaps some good has come out of those terrible events,” says Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage. “In a sense, the National Security Strategy reflects a grand global realignment in which all nations have an opportunity to redefine their priorities. In redefining our priorities, we also have an opportunity to focus international partnerships not just on winning the war against terrorism, but on meeting all transnational challenges to states.”

Late last month, as Americans prepared to celebrate Thanksgiving, the people of Sri Lanka also had much to be grateful for. On November 25th, the representatives of 22 nations — including the United States — came together in Oslo, Norway, to pledge political and financial support for Sri Lanka’s peace process, the best hope in many years of bringing an end to two decades of violence and terror. That day was a clear reminder that even for a small nation such as Sri Lanka, resolving conflict takes the support of a coalition of international partners. That day also served as a reminder that no country can expect to deal effectively with the challenge of terrorism, as well as the conditions that can nurture such violence, without help from other nations and institutions.

Today, at the dawn of the 21st century, the United States stands alone as a nation of unmatched diplomatic, economic, military, and cultural might. As a people, we have greater capacity and capability to protect and advance our interests in the world than at any other time in our history. As a nation, we have greater responsibility to exercise leadership than at any other time in our history.

Nonetheless, for all of our clout and influence, the United States faces some of the same security challenges that countries such as Sri Lanka face. Indeed, no nation can hope to tackle successfully the decisive challenges of this age alone.

This is a fundamental, underlying principle of President Bush’s National

Security Strategy. Beyond devoting a chapter to the strategic importance of alliances and partnerships, the document underscores on nearly every page the necessity of cooperating with other nations, institutions, and organizations. International cooperation is an indispensable ingredient, whether the strategy is focused on fighting the war against terrorism, sustaining regional stability, expanding trade and development, maintaining friendly ties to global powers, or dealing with transnational challenges such as weapons of mass destruction, infectious disease, and international crime.

The U.S. commitment to international cooperation reflects not only pragmatism, but also a principle, one that runs through our history and our vision of the future. As the President’s National Security Strategy makes clear, U.S. foreign policy will serve not just the American people, but “the cause of human dignity” on every continent. This is an ambitious agenda, one that will require us not only to prevail in the war against terrorism, but also to apply the lessons we learn and relationships we build in this war to every other challenge we will face in the 21st century. As the lead agency in developing and maintaining international relations now and for the future, the Department of State, in particular, is playing a key role in implementing this vision. And as the president’s representative in this effort, Secretary of State Colin Powell is taking his re-

sponsibility for building these relationships and orchestrating the efforts of the Department with the utmost gravity and industry.

A basic responsibility for any government is to protect the governed. President Bush’s top strategic priority, therefore, is to protect the American people from another terrorist attack. As the recent bombings in Bali and Kenya illustrate, however, terrorism is a grim reality around the world, and a threat to all nations and peoples. Therefore, our response — and the effect of our policies — must be global. While the United States will always reserve the right to act alone in its own interests, our national security is enhanced when other countries choose to play a constructive, proactive role in helping the United States protect itself. Given the global ambitions of terrorists, national security today is a function of how well all countries protect each other, not just how well one country protects itself.

And while coalition warfare is as old as war itself, today’s coalition against terrorism is unprecedented in scale and in scope. In a monumental diplomatic undertaking, the United States has joined with some 180 other nations to counter the threat of terrorism using all of the tools available to us — intelligence, finance, law enforcement, and military operations. The United Nations set the stage for such a comprehensive coalition by passing Security Council Resolution 1373, which obligated all nations to actively combat financing, recruitment, transit, safe haven,

and other forms of support to terrorists and their backers, as well as to cooperate with other nations' counterterrorism efforts.

America's global network of alliances and partnerships, many configured for Cold War challenges, quickly adapted to this post September 11th security environment. In the immediate aftermath, for example, NATO, ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, and the United States] and the Organization of American States for the first time invoked 50-year-old self-defense mechanisms. Indeed, NATO forces drawn from European nations flew patrols over American skies in the days and months following the attacks. Other multilateral institutions changed course to meet pressing needs. The Financial Action Task Force, originally constituted to track funds fueling the international narcotics trade, took the lead in the hunt for the money trails that lead to terrorists. The G-8 nations moved to secure global networks of commerce and communication, including by stationing customs inspectors in each others' ports through the Container Security Initiative. New relationships also came into play. For example, U.S. diplomats for the first time negotiated with the states of Central Asia for access and overflight rights to American and coalition forces.

This mutually reinforcing mix of ad hoc alliances and more formal arrangements has led to a sustained and successful campaign over the past 14 months. Coalition military operations have excised al Qaeda from Afghanistan, destroying its infrastructure and killing or capturing many of its operatives. The rest remain in hiding and on the run. Intelligence-sharing and law enforcement cooperation have led to the arrest or detention of nearly 2,300 suspected terrorists in 99 nations, and have prevented many, though unfortunately not all, attacks on civilian targets around the world. More than 160 countries have frozen more than \$100 million in assets belonging to terrorists and their supporters. In each of these efforts, foreign policy professionals have played a key role in securing the necessary agreements and actions.

Beyond waging war and building the long-term capacity to fight terrorism, the current international coalition also has been essential to the liberation of Afghanistan. Although this effort is partly humanitarian, it is also an important security measure. For too long, Afghanistan served as both the proving grounds and the launching pad for terrorists. Peace and stability for Afghanistan is in the direct interests not only of the 23 million inhabitants of that country, but also the neighboring nations who suffered from

destabilizing waves of drugs, criminals, and refugees from that territory, and all of the nations of the world whose investment in the rule of law has been put at risk by al Qaeda's activities.

Decades of war have taken an extreme toll on Afghanistan. The country lacks everything from basic infrastructure to civil society institutions, all of which will take considerable resources to restore. Consider that rebuilding a paved road from Kabul to Herat will cost an estimated \$260 million — at least — and that one project alone will take the concerted resources of Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Today, it will take a sustained international political and financial commitment from the community of nations, and the hard diplomatic work to get and sustain this commitment, to keep Afghanistan from chaos.

The twin campaigns to defeat terrorism and reconstruct Afghanistan are stretching global resources and testing international resolve. U.S. leadership — and especially the diplomatic leadership of the Department of State — has been essential to mobilizing both the resources and the resolve, with far-reaching results. As the National Security Strategy notes, "in leading the campaign against terrorism, we are forging new, productive international relationships and redefining existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the 21st century."

Like terrorism, many of the challenges of the 21st century will be transnational in nature, from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to the need to ensure that all nations can benefit from a globalized economy, to the spread of infectious diseases. Even internal unrest will continue to have regional consequences. These transnational problems will require transnational solutions, and the current war is helping the United States to develop the requisite patterns and habits of cooperation.

Cold War alliances and rivalries, reinterpreted for the age of terrorism, are showing promising signs of flexibility. In particular, as the National Security

Strategy notes, the United States may have a new opportunity for a future where "main centers of global power" cooperate more and compete less. From Russian President [Vladimir] Putin's immediate offer of condolences and support after the 9/11 [September 11, 2001] attacks, U.S.-Russian cooperation in the war on terrorism has been path-breaking in its breadth, depth, and openness. The United States has also forged new relationships with China, which has provided valuable assistance in tracking terrorist finances. In both cases, the overlap in our current efforts is opening new possibilities for dialogue in areas that have traditionally been difficult, including regional security issues, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights concerns, and key trade issues, such as accession to the World Trade Organization.

Multilateral institutions also are showing signs of new growth. Following extensive U.S. diplomatic efforts, the United Nations passed Resolution 1441, for example, taking a tough new stand against the threat posed by Iraqi possession of chemical, biological, and potentially nuclear weapons. NATO, too, has retooled to meet today's needs. At the recent summit in Prague, NATO invited seven European nations to join as new members, reaffirmed its commitment to developing updated military capabilities, and emphasized its new and deepening relationships with Russia, Central Asia, and other regions beyond Europe.

The international recognition that underlying corrosive conditions — such as repression, poverty, and disease — present a threat to international stability is also spurring the growth of new cooperative mechanisms. U.S. leadership is key to these efforts, as well, but will only truly be effective insofar as it leverages commitments from other nations. HIV/AIDS, for example, presents a staggering public health crisis and ultimately a risk to the stability of many regions. The United States made the initial and single largest

donation to a new Global Fund, kicked off by the G-8 [Group of Eight industrialized nations] and endorsed by the United Nations, to prevent the spread and deal with the effects of the disease. That Fund has now reached a total of \$2.1 billion [\$2,100 million]. At the United Nations Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey and other such venues, the United States has



Photo: (Left), Halabja citizens had no protection against Chemical attack from Iraq, in 1988. (Below), Young victims of the Halabja attacks. (Courtesy of the Kurdistan Democratic Party)



helped to forge new approaches to international aid, based on principles of accountability, fiscal responsibility, and good governance. Indeed, the U.S. has established the \$5,000 million Millennium Challenge Account — a 50 percent increase in the U.S. commitment to foreign assistance — which will be dispensed according to these basic tenets.

Ultimately, these habits and patterns of cooperation will persist because of the dual imperatives of pragmatism and principle. First, cooperation in dealing with transnational challenges is in the self-interest of so many nations, and second, nations have a dedication to certain shared values. Terrorists, for example, present a clear and direct threat

to the rule of law, to international norms and standards for human dignity, and in the end, to the international system of states itself.

September 11th was a devastating day in American and world history, but perhaps some good has come out of those terrible events. In a sense, the National Security Strategy reflects a grand global realignment in which all nations have an opportunity to redefine their priorities. In redefining our priorities, we also have an opportunity to focus international partnerships not just on winning the war against terrorism, but on meeting all transnational challenges to states. Every nation in the world — from Sri Lanka to Afghanistan to America — stands to benefit.***

made that point at a talk he gave on conflict resolution at the Heritage Foundation in November 2002. “Africa is of great importance to this Administration, I’m pleased to say, and I think [this is] reflected in the President’s National Security report.” Looking toward the future, he added, “I think Africa is going to continue to play an important role in our national interests ... becoming much more viable to the United States” over time.

Brett Schaefer, Africa specialist at the Heritage Foundation, was not surprised at Africa’s place in the strategy plan. “I think the president has actually put quite an emphasis on Africa over the past year or so,” he said. “Then-Secretary [of the Treasury] Paul O’Neill went over there for an extended trip; Bush announced the Millennium Challenge Account [50 percent of which will go to Africa] and he announced the HIV/AIDS and water initiatives, both of which are targeted at Africa. So it was natural that Africa got the mention it did in the security paper.

“From a national security standpoint, the administration’s recommendations are quite consistent,” Schaefer added. “They are trying to focus on reducing conflict and instability within Africa, which is a large priority. And they want to work with their European allies to achieve those objectives, especially if there is a need for peace operations.”

On the latter point, Schaefer said, “Africa, as important as it is, obviously is not a place where America would seek to station vast amounts of troops. So the administration is trying to multiply its impact by working with other nations such as the regional powers it mentions in the strategy.”

In contrast, Steve Morrisson, director of Africa programs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said the plan’s emphasis on Africa is “pretty dramatic on several levels. First of all, at a conceptual level, it is a departure from business as usual because the new terrorism prevention strategy says: ‘Broken, chaotic places that we thought were marginal before are in fact now a priority because they are places that could provide venues for the shadow networks of terror.’” Second, “the explicit mention and designation of Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Nigeria as key partners” is unique for such a policy document. And third, “the

Africa: A Top Policy Priority in The New Bush Strategy Plan

By James Fisher-Thompson, Washington File Staff Writer
Office of African Affairs
Office of International Information Programs
U.S. Department of State

According to President Bush’s new National Security Strategy, “Africa is important to peace and security worldwide and will receive all necessary help from the United States aimed at furthering its overall political and economic development,” says James Fisher-Thompson, a Washington File Staff Writer in the Office of African Affairs. Fisher-Thompson interviewed a series of current and former U.S. government officials and prominent American scholars specializing in African affairs on what the security strategy plan has to say about U.S. policy toward Africa.

U.S. officials as well as several noted Africanists, in separate conversations recently, agreed that President Bush’s new national security plan is clear evidence that a stable and democratic Africa remains a priority goal of the U.S. government. According to “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” a plan of action issued by the White House on September 20, Africa is important to peace and security worldwide and will receive all necessary help from the United States aimed at furthering its overall political and economic development.

The top Africa policy-maker at the State Department, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner,



Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Walter Kansteiner

assertion that we would work very aggressively, with those four and others, within sub-regional settings to manage crises” is new.

Bush’s strategy plan “elevates the possible levels of achievement and lays out a much more ambitious range of diplomatic and political instruments America is now prepared to use to help Africans” to combat scourges like corruption, political instability, terrorism, and disease, he explained.

Chairman of the House Africa Subcommittee, Representative Ed Royce (Republican of California), commented on the plan’s importance saying, “I am pleased that the Bush Administration has articulated the critical importance of Africa to U.S. interests in its National Security Strategy. It is very important that we build strategic relationships with countries and regional organizations in Africa for our mutual security.”

On the economic level, the lawmaker added, “President Bush and I are united in our belief that one way to significantly increase political and economic freedom on the continent is through U.S. trade and investment.”

With the war on terrorism the U.S. government’s chief foreign policy priority, the Bush strategy paper emphasized that America can never be secure while economic hardship and political unrest abound. In a preface to the plan, President Bush said, “Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”

According to the plan, in Africa “promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States — preserving human dignity — and our strategic priority — combating global terror.” Therefore, it says, the U.S. government “will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity.”

The section of the Bush strategy plan entitled “Work With Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts” cites three key “interlocking strategies” for U.S. policymakers:

- ◆ working with countries “with major impact on their neighborhoods, such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia;
- ◆ coordinating with European allies and international institutions, which is “essential for constructive conflict mediation and successful peace operations”; and

- ◆ aiding Africa’s “capable reforming states and subregional organizations,” which “must be strengthened as the primary means to address transnational threats on a sustained basis.”

For former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, the focus on Africa in the national strategy paper is “a pleasing development, but not a great surprise.” He said, “It’s good that he [Bush] stressed the development aspect because Africans are making serious attempts to reform, although Africa is not a source of terrorism like other regions of the world.”

Cohen, a former U.S. Ambassador to Senegal who now runs his own international consulting firm, said, “Africa suffered terrorist attacks [on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998], but these came from outside” the continent. “I can’t think of a single instance where there was an anti-American terrorist attack coming from Africa itself. And there were no Africans in these groups — al Qaeda or what have you — even though 50 percent of Africans are Muslims — and devout Muslims at that.”

Cohen said that “African nations are cooperating with U.S. authorities on the war on terrorism and are making the kinds of political and economic reforms that attract investors. So it’s only natural that this administration sees Africa as worthy of the type of development assistance that enhances trade and investment.”

Royce said, “By trading more with African countries, we increase the capacity of those governments and the standard of living of Africans, cooperatively building a stronger state in which people can exercise their freedoms and terrorists cannot so easily thrive. It is noteworthy that trade with the continent increased last year, while trade with other continents either stagnated or declined.”

He added, “Aside from working with Congress on extending the benefits of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Bush Administration is also in the process of developing free trade agreements with Morocco and the countries of the Southern Africa Customs Union.” President Bush signed into law last August an amended version of the trade bill called AGOAI, which extends favorable trade benefits even further for more than 35 eligible nations in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to the points raised by Royce, the national security strategy outlines U.S. government assistance to the continent that includes:

- ◆ Ensuring that World Trade Organization (WTO) intellectual property rules are “flexible enough to allow developing nations to gain access to critical medicines for extraordinary dangers like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria”;
- ◆ Stepping up development assistance in the form of the new multi-billion-dollar Millennium Challenge Account, 50 percent of which will go to eligible African nations that President Bush said “govern justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom”;
- ◆ Proposing an 18 percent increase in U.S. contributions to the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank’s fund for poor countries, and the African Development Bank (AfDB).

“It’s a complicated business to get involved in African affairs, but the continent does need institutional development for cooperation and the United States can help” by working with foreign allies as well as regional organizations on the continent, said I. William Zartman, the director of the Conflict Management Program at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and former director of its African Studies department.

He said the security plan’s focus on coordinating with “European allies” is “absolutely on target, especially concerning the French.”

“It is time we worked with France to get over their part and our part of the ‘Fashoda complex,’ where they see any American activity or presence in Africa as an attempt to kick them out and where we see the French as leftover colonialists. We have got to discontinue this spitting war that has hurt us too much,” Zartman declared.

On the report’s call to strengthen “Africa’s capable reforming states and subregional organizations,” the SAIS scholar said, “I think the most important reform proposed for Africa over the last decade was the CSSDCA, or the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, otherwise known as ‘the Kampala Document.’ It was the most important blueprint for change on the continent and deserves our support.”

Zartman recently co-authored a book on the subject with fellow Africanist Francis Deng, called “Strategic Vision for Africa.” While CSSDCA has become somewhat fragmented, he said, a part of

its “spirit” — the idea that intervention by a group of states into the affairs of another state can be justified because of gross humanitarian violations — has been taken up by the new African Union (AU), the successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

This came about, the scholar explained, because CSSDA was modeled after the 1975 Helsinki Accords, whose emphasis on human rights eventually contributed to the downfall of the Soviet Union. Like Helsinki’s “baskets” of issues, CSSDA has a number of “calabashes,” he explained, adding, “Interestingly, the development calabash seems to be pretty much replicated in NEPAD [New Partnership for Africa’s Development].”

NEPAD is a socio-economic framework for development formulated by leaders on the continent like South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki and now endorsed by the African Union (AU). Unique among similar African roadmaps for development, NEPAD includes a “peer review mechanism” that encourages political reform and transparency for eligible African nations.

The White House security plan singled out the AU for mention, saying, “The transition to the African Union with its stated commitment to good governance and a common responsibility for democratic political systems offers opportunities to strengthen democracy on the continent.”

This “is an appropriate move,” said former assistant secretary Cohen, because, “the AU, as well as grassroots efforts like NEPAD, are making a genuine attempt to understand why African development has been lagging. They have discovered that that includes bad economic policies that have to be reformed and also that good governance and democracy have been lagging, which are needed to encourage investments.”

The brainchild of leaders like Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and South African President Thabo Mbeki, NEPAD is as much a guide for development on the continent as it is a plan of action.



Secretary Powell at the African Growth Opportunity Act Business Roundtable.

Assistant Secretary Walter Kansteiner recently praised the program saying, “At the core of NEPAD’s theology ... is a notion that good governance is not only expected, but good governance is going to be required.” Kansteiner said, “That’s a different perspective than what we’ve seen in the past, and we think it’s an important one — we embrace it fully.”

Cohen called NEPAD “very encouraging because it is not just the U.S. telling them what to do, but it is the Africans themselves recognizing that they have a problem and moving to correct it.”

With that in mind, the security plan’s focus on AGOA was also a good move, Cohen said, because “if you look at some of the trade statistics since AGOA started [two years ago], the countries that are doing best in terms of economic growth are the ones benefiting from AGOA. For example, South Africa is exporting BMW cars [to the U.S. market].”

This means that “a lot of South African workers and their families are doing better now because of AGOA,” Cohen said. And, he added, “I personally believe that is what Africa needs — more revenue from trade so that wealth can be created for governments to provide more social services and infrastructure like clean water and electricity.”

Heritage’s Schaefer agreed with Cohen on the benefits of AGOA, noting, “All in all, the trade act has been a very large success for the continent as far as exports are concerned.” The Africanist disagreed, however, on the importance of the newly formed AU. “I’m a little skeptical of the AU,” he said. “It seems to be a repackaging of the old organization in new paper.”

He added: “The promises sound great, but it [AU] has been reluctant to chastise one of the most horrific abusers of his own people on the continent — [Zimbabwe’s President] Robert Mugabe. This lapse seems to be a bright neon arrow pointing to the weakness of the organization, and that is [the fact that] African nations seem to be very reluctant to chastise each other.”

In order to keep Africa from being bypassed or “marginalized” in the new global economy — an important requisite to political well being and security, policymakers say — the U.S. Government has put its money where its mouth is. In 2001 alone, it contributed more than \$1,100 million to development programs and humanitarian assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. It is the single largest donor to HIV/AIDS programs on the continent as well as the single largest contributor to assistance programs in countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Somalia.***

POWELL LAUNCHES MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE

Supports expanded economic, political, educational opportunities

The United States has launched a \$29 million program to give “sustained” support to economic, educational and political reform in the Middle East, Secretary of State Colin Powell said in Washington December 12.

“It has become increasingly clear that we must broaden our approach to the region if we are to achieve success. In particular, we must give sustained and energetic attention to economic, political, and educational reform. We must work with peoples and governments to close the gulf between expectation and reality that Jordan’s Queen Rania has so eloquently called the ‘hope gap,’” Powell said in a speech launching the Middle East Partnership Initiative.

Powell said the plan aims to enable the people of the Middle East to benefit from the prosperity and human well-being that the spread of democracy and free markets, fueled by technology, has brought to much of the rest of the world on an unprecedented scale.

Powell said the initiative provides crucial underpinning for U.S. policy goals in the region — winning the war on terrorism, disarming Iraq, and bringing the Arab-Israeli conflict to an end.

“Any approach to the Middle East that ignores its political, economic, and educational underdevelopment will be built upon sand,” Powell said.

Powell said the U.S. government is dedicating \$29 million to the initiative in its first year and will seek significant additional funding in the next year.

“These funds will be over and above the more than \$1 billion we provide in economic assistance to the Arab world every year,” Powell said.

The economic part of the initiative involves working with the public and private sectors to establish economic rules and regulations that will attract private investment and allow the private sector to flourish, Powell said.

Powell said the United States will help small and medium sized businesses gain access to capital and will also support with technical assistance countries such as Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Lebanon and Yemen that want to join the World Trade Organization. He said the United States will explore ways to enhance bilateral economic ties, such as possible free trade agreements.

The political aspect of the initiative involves partnering with community leaders to strengthen civil society, expand political participation, and “lift the voices of women.”

To expand educational opportunities for the people of the Middle East, Powell said the United States will work with parents and educators to provide better schools and more opportunities for higher education. The secretary said the educational programs will emphasize the education of girls.

“When girls’ literacy rates improve, all the other important indicators of development in a country improve, as well. We will provide scholarships to keep girls in school and expand literacy for girls and women,” Powell said.

Following is the transcript of Powell’s speech:



Secretary of State Collin Powell

SECRETARY POWELL:

Thank you very much, Ed, for that warm introduction. It’s a great pleasure to be with you this afternoon, and Frank and Bill, good to be with you both. And to many other distinguished ladies and gentlemen, excellencies, friends, I want to thank you especially, and the Heritage Foundation, for inviting me here to spend a few moments with this audience and with the watching and listening audience and discuss the hopes and aspirations that we share with the peoples of the Middle East.

I also especially want to welcome the distinguished guests in the diplomatic corps, Congressional staff, the NGO community, and the private sector. Thank all of you for finding time in your schedule to join us this afternoon.

It is fitting that we meet here at the Heritage Foundation. For the Heritage Foundation’s vision — to build a country “where freedom, opportunity, prosperity, and civil society flourish” — is the same vision, the very same vision, that we share with the peoples of the Middle East for their countries.

The Middle East is a vast region of vast importance to the American people. Millions of us worship in churches, mosques, and synagogues, professing the three great faiths that were born in the lands between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf.

Our language and traditions are filled with references to Jerusalem, to Bethlehem, to Mecca.

Our phone books list names — such as Mousavi, Levy, and Shaheen — that speak of deep family roots in the Middle East.

Our farmers grow wheat, and our workers make airplanes, computers, and many other products that we sell to the countries of the region. We, in turn, benefit from traded goods and investment from the Middle East.

Tragically, thousands of our countrymen and women died on September 11th, 2001, at the hands of terrorists born and radicalized in the Middle East.

Recognizing the region's importance, we have for half a century and more devoted our blood and our treasure to helping the peoples and governments of the Middle East.

Indeed, my own career in public service, and especially military service, has been shaped by events in that region. I was privileged to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when the United States led the international coalition, which included many Arab countries, that evicted the Iraqi invaders from Kuwait. Today, as Secretary of State, the Middle East requires and deserves a great deal of my attention.

Our Middle East policy has emphasized winning the war on terrorism, disarming Iraq, and bringing the Arab-Israeli conflict to an end.

The war on terrorism is not confined to the Middle East. Our friends there have a very important stake in that conflict and in winning that conflict because many have suffered the scourge of terrorism first hand. I am pleased that our friends have stepped up to the challenge by extending basing rights for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, exchanging intelligence and law enforcement information, arresting suspected terrorists, and clamping down on terrorist financing.

With the countries of the Middle East, our friends and allies, and the community of nations, we must also deal with the grave and growing danger posed by the Iraqi regime, led by Saddam Hussein. By unanimously passing Resolution 1441, the United Nations Security Council has offered Iraq a final opportunity to meet its obligations to peace and to the international community. The Iraqi regime can either disarm, or it will be disarmed. The choice is theirs — but this decision cannot be postponed.

We also have a deep and abiding national interest in bringing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to an end. With our friends in the region and the international community, we are working to bring about a lasting peace based on President Bush's vision of two states, living side-by-side, in

peace and security. This peace will require from the Palestinians a new and different leadership, new institutions, and an end to terror and violence. As the Palestinians make progress in this direction, Israel will also be required to make hard choices, including an end to all settlement construction activity, consistent with the Mitchell Report.

As President Bush has stated, with intensive effort by all, the creation of a democratic, viable Palestine is possible in 2005.

Our ultimate goal is a just and comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement, in which all the peoples of the region are accepted as neighbors, living in peace and security, and building a better future for all the peoples of the region.

These challenges have been at the forefront of America's Middle East policy, and with good reason. Each of these challenges profoundly affects our national interest, and the interests of the peoples who call the Middle East home. We remain deeply committed to meeting each of these challenges, meeting them with energy and determination.

At the same time, it has become increasingly clear that we must broaden our approach to the region if we are to achieve success. In particular, we must give sustained and energetic attention to economic, political, and educational reform. We must work with peoples and governments to close the gulf between expectation and reality that Queen Rania of Jordan has so eloquently termed the "hope gap."

The spread of democracy and free markets, fueled by the wonders of the technological revolution, has created a dynamo that can generate prosperity and human well-being on an unprecedented scale. But this revolution has left much of the Middle East behind.

Throughout history, the countries of the Middle East have made invaluable contributions to the development of the arts and sciences. Today, however, too many people there lack the very political and economic freedom, empowerment of women, and modern education they need to prosper in the 21st century. The 2002 Arab Human Development Report, written by leading Arab scholars and issued by the United Nations, identified a fundamental choice — between "inertia ... [and] an Arab renaissance that will build a prosperous future for all Arabs."

These are not my words. They come from Arab experts who have looked deeply into the issues. They are based on the stark facts.

Some 14 million Arab adults lack the

jobs they need to put food on the table, a roof over the heads of their families, and to put hope not only in their hearts but the hearts of their children. Fifty million more Arab young people will enter the already crowded job market over the next eight years.

But economies are not creating enough jobs. Growth is weak. The GDP of 260 million Arabs is already less than that of 40 million Spaniards, and falling even further behind. Add in the production of 67 million people in Iran, and the total is still only two-thirds of Italy's.

Internally, many economies are stifled by regulation and cronyism. They lack transparency, and are closed to entrepreneurship, investment, and trade.

The countries of the Middle East are also largely absent from world markets. They generate barely one percent of the world's non-oil exports. Only ten Middle Eastern countries belong to the World Trade Organization. The region's governments are now recognizing, as Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak has warned, that "giving a boost to exports is a matter of life or death."

A shortage of economic opportunities is a ticket to despair. Combined with rigid political systems, it is a dangerous brew indeed. So, along with freer economies, many of the peoples of the Middle East need a stronger political voice.

We reject the condescending notion that freedom will not grow in the Middle East, or that there is any region of the world that cannot support democracy.

President Bush gave voice to the yearnings of people everywhere when he declared, in his West Point address, that "when it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world."

Given a choice between tyranny and freedom, people choose freedom. We need only look to the streets of Kabul, filled with people celebrating the end of Taliban rule last year.

There are rays of hope in the Middle East, as well. Countries such as Bahrain, Qatar, and Morocco have embarked on bold political reforms. Civic organizations are increasingly active in many Arab countries, working on bread-and-butter issues such as securing badly needed identity cards for women.

We are also seeing an explosion of media outlets, from satellite television stations to weekly tabloids. Though some still do not live up to their responsibility to deliver responsible coverage and factual

information, altogether they are making information available to more people than ever before. And with information, ultimately comes knowledge, knowledge to raise young people up, knowledge about what is happening in other parts of the world.

Still, too many Middle Easterners are ruled by closed political systems. Too many governments curb the institutions of civil society as a threat, rather than welcome them as the basis for a free, dynamic, and hopeful society. And the language of hate, exclusion, and incitement to violence is still all too common throughout the region.

As Morocco's King Mohammed told his country's parliament two years ago, "to achieve development, democracy, and modernization, it is necessary to improve and strengthen political parties, trade unions, associations, and the media, and to enlarge the scope of participation."

Finally, too many of the region's children lack the knowledge to take advantage of a world of economic and political freedom. Ten million school-age children are at home, at work, or on the streets, instead of being in class. Some 65 million of their parents cannot read or write, let alone help them with their lessons, teach them to read or write. Barely one person out of a hundred has access to a computer. Of those, only half can reach the wider world via the Internet.

Even when children do go to school, they often fail to learn the skills that they will so desperately need to be successful in the 21st century world. "Education" too often means rote learning rather than the creative, critical thinking essential for success in our globalizing world.

The authors of the Arab Development Report have found that "education has begun to lose its significant role as a means of achieving social advancement in Arab countries, turning instead into a means of perpetuating social stratification and poverty." This is a telling indictment, but it is more than that; this is a call to action.

There is a constant theme running through these challenges, and that is the marginalization of women. More than half of the Arab world's women are illiterate. They suffer more than men from unemployment and lack of economic opportunity. Women also make up a smaller proportion of members of parliament in Arab countries than in any other region of the world.

Until the countries of the Middle East unleash the abilities and potential of their women, they will not build a future of hope. Any approach to the Middle East that ignores its political, economic, and educational underdevelopment will be built upon sand.

It is time to lay a firm foundation of hope. Hope is what my presentation today is about. America wants to align itself with the people of the Middle East, moving forward on the basis of hope, hope for peace, hope for a better life for the children of the Middle East and the children of the world. To that end, I am announcing today an initiative that places the United States firmly on the side of change, on the side of reform, and on the side of a modern future for the Middle East, on the side of hope. During last March's visit by President Mubarak to Washington, President Bush asked me to head a new American government effort to support the peoples and governments of the Middle East in their efforts to meet these challenging and pressing human needs.

I am pleased to announce the initial results of our work — an innovative set of programs and a framework for future cooperation that we call the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative.

The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative is a bridge between the United States and the Middle East, between our governments and our peoples, an initiative that spans the hope gap with energy, ideas, and funding.

Our Partnership Initiative is a continuation, and a deepening, of our longstanding commitment to working with all the peoples of the Middle East to improve their daily lives and to help them face the future with hope.

Just as our decision to rejoin UNESCO is a symbol of our commitment to advancing human rights and tolerance and learning, so this Initiative is a concrete demonstration of our commitment to human dignity in the Middle East.

We are initially dedicating \$29 million to get this Initiative off to a strong start. Working with Congress, we will seek significant additional funding for next year. These funds will be over and above the more than \$1 billion we provide in economic assistance to the Arab world every year. Our initiative rests on three pillars.

We will engage with public and private sector groups to bridge the jobs gap with economic reform, business investment, and private sector development.

We will partner with community leaders to close the freedom gap with projects to strengthen civil society, expand political participation, and lift the voices of women. And, we will work with parents and educators to bridge the knowledge gap with better schools and more opportunities for higher education.

My friends, hope begins with a paycheck. And that requires a vibrant

economy. Through the United States-Middle East Partnership Initiative, we will work with governments to establish economic rules and regulations that will attract foreign investment and allow the private sector to flourish.

We will help small and medium-sized businesses gain access to the life-blood of capital. As a first step, I am pleased to announce that we will establish Enterprise Funds for the Middle East, modeled after the successful Polish-American Enterprise Fund, and these funds will begin investing in promising new businesses.

We will also help more countries share in the bounty of the global economy. That means offering aspiring World Trading Organization members like Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Lebanon, and Yemen, technical assistance to meet the WTO's membership criteria.

It means building upon our successful Free Trade Agreement with Jordan by beginning FTA negotiations with Morocco. And, it means continuing to work with countries like Egypt and Bahrain to explore ways to enhance our bilateral economic trade relationships, including through possible free trade agreements.

Open economies, to be successful, require open political systems. So the second pillar of our Partnership Initiative will support citizens across the region who are claiming their political voices.

We began the first pilot project in this area last month, when we brought a delegation of 55 Arab women, women political leaders, brought them to the United States to observe our mid-term elections.

I had an excellent meeting with this remarkable group, and I was inspired by their energy and their commitment. They put tough questions to me, and we debated the issues as people do in a free society.

These women were proud of their heritage. They spoke eloquently of their dreams of a world where their children could grow up and live in peace. They told of their hopes to see an end to the conflicts that cripple their region. They also spoke of their expectations of America. They talked about how they want control over their own lives and their own destinies. And, they asked to know more about American democracy, and how to make their own voices more effective.

Increased political participation also requires strengthening the civic institutions that protect individual rights and provide opportunities for participation. Through our Partnership Initiative we will support these efforts.

To be effective, free economies and open political systems need educated

citizens, so the third pillar of the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative will focus on education reform.

Our programs will pay particular emphasis to the education of girls. An Egyptian poet once wrote that, "A mother is a school. Empower her and you empower a great nation." He was right. When girls' literacy rates improve, all the other important indicators of development in a country improve, as well.

With the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative we will provide scholarships to keep girls in school and expand literacy for girls and women. More broadly, we will work with parents and educators to strengthen local and parental oversight of school systems.

In each of these three areas, we are committed to genuine, two-way partnership with the citizens and countries of the region, with Congress, and even with other donors as we implement this agenda. The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative is one of the most challenging undertakings that we and our friends in the region have ever considered. We should be quite realistic as we move forward about the obstacles that are ahead, about the time that it will take to see real change take root, about the limited role that outsiders can play. We can and must understand that genuine Middle Eastern interest must drive this initiative, and only Middle Eastern engagement will sustain it over time.

But we should also avoid resigning ourselves to low expectations. As the ferment in the region shows, the peoples of the Middle East themselves are seized with these issues. These are issues they are talking about. These are problems they are ready to deal with.

We are not starting from scratch, either. We are already working successfully with a broad array of partners. For example, just last month we announced the establishment of the LEAD Foundation, in which the United States Agency for International Development is partnering with the World Bank and the Egyptian private sector to support micro-enterprise lending in Egypt.

In addition, through our Partnership for Learning, we are already engaged with the countries of the region on teacher training, English-language instruction, and other programs to strengthen their educational systems.

Indeed, an important part of our work will involve reviewing our existing programs to learn from them and to make sure our assistance touches as many lives as possible.

Nor are we advocating a "one size fits all" approach. The region is much too diverse for that. We will be on the ground

listening and working to make sure our programs are tailored to meet the needs of people where they live their lives.

In my travels throughout the Middle East in public and in private life, I have seen first hand the energy, creativity and dedication of parents as they try to build a better future for their children. But I have also seen their frustration when progress

is so painfully slow. We must move faster. And we will move faster.

Through the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative, we are adding hope to the U.S.-Middle East agenda. We are pledging our energy, our ability, and our idealism to bring hope to all of God's children who call the Middle East home.

Thank you very much.***

Fact Sheet Outlines U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative

Supports educational, economic, political reform in Arab World

Summary:

◆ The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative will provide a framework and funding for the U.S. to work together with governments and people in the Arab world to expand economic, political and educational opportunities for all.

◆ The Initiative will encompass the more than \$1 billion in assistance that the U.S. government provides to Arab countries annually. The United States is also committing \$29 million in initial funding for pilot projects in support of reform in each area listed above. We will also be requesting significant additional funds next year.

◆ The Initiative is a partnership and we will work closely with governments in the Arab world, other donors, academic institutions, the private sector and non-governmental organizations.

◆ As part of the Initiative, we will review existing U.S. assistance programs in the region to ensure our aid is reaching as many people as possible across the region, with a particular emphasis on women and children. We also want to insure that we are providing the most effective and efficient assistance possible.

◆ Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage will serve as coordinator for the Initiative. The Initiative will be managed by the Near East Affairs Bureau of the Department of State.

◆ Examples of programs we will fund and expect to fund in the future include the following:

Education

◆ "Partnerships for Learning" program to share knowledge with all levels of society in the Middle East through programs such as a Georgia State University workshop for non-governmental (NGO) leaders from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates.

◆ Programs focused on improving the lives of girls and women through literacy training and scholarships to stay in school.

◆ Efforts that expand access to bodies of knowledge and promote active learning, for example through e-learning, English teaching and book publishing initiatives. We will focus in particular on connecting more schools and students to the Internet.

◆ Implementing teacher training programs at the primary and secondary school levels and expanding university linkages for higher education.

◆ Scholarships for undergraduate study in the United States and in American universities within the region, focusing on degrees in fields such as economics, education, business administration, information technology, and the sciences.

Economic Reform and Private Sector Development

◆ Assistance to Arab members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to help them comply with their commitments and technical assistance on WTO criteria to aspiring WTO members in the region.

◆ Enterprise funds with private sector management to provide capital and technical assistance to promising entrepreneurs and their business ventures. We will also establish new micro-enterprise programs to help new micro-business.

◆ New Department of Commerce Special American Business Internship Training scholarships, which will provide internships in American companies, and also will focus on developing networks and training opportunities for women entrepreneurs from the Middle East.

◆ Assistance in financial sector reform for governments across the region.

◆ Programs to assist on-going efforts to increase transparency and fight corruption.

Strengthening Civil Society

◆ Through mechanisms such as the Middle East Democracy Fund, assistance to non-governmental organizations and individuals from across the political spectrum working for political reform.

◆ Support for establishment of more NGOs, independent media outlets, polling organizations, think tanks, and business associations — groups that create the foundation for a vibrant democracy.

◆ Programs that will increase the transparency of legal and regulatory systems and improve administration of the judicial process.

◆ Training for candidates for political office and for members of parliaments and other elected officials.

◆ Training and exchanges for electronic and print journalists.***

IRAQ: From Fear to Freedom

WMD: The Deadliest Threat of All

Saddam Hussein's quest to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been systematic and relentless — undeterred by military defeat, U.N. Security Council resolutions, international inspections, economic cost, political isolation, comprehensive sanctions, or the impact on the welfare of his own people. The persistence and scale of Iraq's efforts to acquire these weapons is so striking that it has led many observers to conclude that Saddam does not regard them simply as attributes of national power, but as essential to his ambitions for personal power.

In other words, for Saddam to give up VX gas or biological agents such as botulinum toxin would be to undermine the very foundation of fear and terror with which he rules the Iraqi people and threatens his neighbors.

The regime's lies about its efforts to develop and conceal its weapons of mass destruction have been equally systematic. In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on September 19, 2002, Saddam Hussein wrote: "We hereby declare before you that Iraq is clear of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons."

Every part of this statement is suspect. In April 1991, as a condition for the cessation of hostilities following Iraq's defeat and ejection from Kuwait by coalition forces, Baghdad unconditionally accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, which required Iraq to declare and destroy or "render harmless" its weapons of mass destruction, and to forego the development or acquisition of such weapons in the future. To implement 687 and subsequent Security Council resolutions, the United Nations established the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued to have special responsibility for nuclear matters.

Throughout the 1990s, Iraq engaged in a policy of obstruction, concealment, and outright harassment of UNSCOM weapons inspectors — all designed to hide and preserve a significant portion of its infrastructure, warheads, stockpiles, and expertise related to its WMD programs. An October 2002 report from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs*, states:



U.N. Chief Inspector Hans Blix (right) and the IAEA's Mohamed ElBaradei arrive in Iraq on November 18, 2002, to resume the search for weapons of mass destruction. (AP Photo/Hussein Manila)

Baghdad's determination to hold on to a sizeable remnant of its WMD arsenal, agents, equipment, and expertise has led to years of dissembling and obstruction of U.N. inspections. Elite Iraqi security services orchestrated an extensive concealment and deception campaign to hide incriminating documents and material that precluded resolution of key issues pertaining to its WMD programs.

Only under sustained pressure from U.N. weapons inspectors did Iraq's declarations of its weapons and stockpiles become more accurate. Even so, according to the CIA report: "Iraq has never fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in its declarations and has provided no credible proof that it has completely destroyed its weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure."

UNSCOM finally withdrew permanently from Iraq in 1998 after determining that Iraqi harassment and duplicity made it impossible for inspectors to continue their work. UNSCOM has been succeeded by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), created by a Security Council resolution in December 1999. Iraq has refused to accept UNMOVIC inspectors for the past three years.

When Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus stepped down as the first head of UNSCOM in 1997, he said:

The present leader of Iraq has demonstrated that he has ambitions for his country reaching far outside the borders of Iraq. These grand designs of extended influence presuppose access to weapons of mass

destruction and the means for their delivery...

It is highly doubtful that any alternative Iraqi leadership would continue to pursue a weapons of mass destruction program, considering that the consequences of such a policy would be sanctions, political isolation, and loss of huge financial revenues from blocked oil exports.

Chemical Weapons

Iraq launched an ambitious chemical weapons program beginning in the 1970s, and deployed such hideous weapons in both the eight-year Iran-Iraq War and the Al-Anfal campaign against the Kurds. According to documented accounts, Iraqi military forces attacked Iranian and Kurdish targets with various combinations of mustard gas and tabun and sarin nerve agents, employing aerial bombs, 122-millimeter rockets, aerial spray dispensers similar to those used by crop-dusting aircraft, and conventional artillery shells. In addition to many thousands of Iraqi Kurds, estimates are that more than 20,000 Iranians died in Iraqi chemical attacks.



U.N. workers in the 1990s seal leaking Iraqi 122-millimeter rockets, which were reportedly filled with sarin. (AP Photo/MOD)

Before their forced departure from Iraq in 1998, U.N. weapons inspectors oversaw the destruction of more than 40,000 chemical munitions, nearly 500,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of chemicals used in the manufacture of such chemical-war agents, and seven types of delivery systems, including ballistic missile warheads.

Despite these impressive totals, there is powerful evidence, from multiple sources, that Iraq possesses a stockpile of chemical agents that probably includes VX, sarin, cyclosarin, and mustard gas. Moreover,

it is highly likely that Iraq has concealed chemical precursors, production equipment, and documentation necessary to sustain its chemical weapons programs. At least two significant pieces of public evidence support this contention. One is a 1998 Iraqi Air Force document, discovered by UNSCOM, showing that Iraq overstated by at least 6,000 the number of chemical bombs it claimed to have used during the Iran-Iraq War — in other words, an attempt to hide these bombs from outside discovery. The second, according to the October 2002 CIA report, is that Iraq has never accounted for approximately 15,000 artillery rockets that were the primary means for delivering nerve agents, or for 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas.

Iraq continues to expand dual-use sites that, in the view of experts, could be quickly converted to chemical weapons production. The Fallujah II facility, one of Baghdad's principal production plants for chemical agents prior to the Gulf War, has now been upgraded with new chemical reactor vessels and other production equipment. Iraq now has chlorine production capacity far higher than any civilian need for water treatment, and evidence indicates that a significant amount of its chlorine imports are being diverted for military purposes.

Biological Weapons

For years, Iraq denied that it had an offensive biological weapons program of any kind. Despite such stonewalling, U.N. weapons inspectors uncovered evidence of an extensive and ongoing effort to develop biological weapons.

Then, in 1995, Hussein Kamal, Saddam's son-in-law and director of Iraq's military industries, defected and provided verification of Iraq's bioweapons program. The regime was forced to admit the truth: production of thousands of liters of such deadly agents as anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin.



U.N. workers in Iraq in 1996 destroy growth media that could be used to produce biological weapons. (AP Photo/UNSCOM)



In 1996, a U.S. worker in Iraq dismantles a fermentation tank that could be used to produce biological weapons prior to its destruction. (AP Photo/UNSCOM)

UNSCOM supervised destruction of a major Iraqi biological weapons production facility at Al-Hakam, as well as destroying a variety of bioweapons and materials such as bacterial-growth media necessary to produce biological agents. Nevertheless, Iraq once again engaged in a pattern of systematic deception concerning its development and stockpiling of biological agents. UNSCOM experts concluded that Iraq actually produced two to four times the amounts UNSCOM destroyed of *Bacillus anthracis* (the agent that causes anthrax) and botulinum toxin, which paralyzes respiratory muscles.

The evidence for Baghdad's efforts to sustain and expand its biological weapons program is substantial. According to the CIA report, the Al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility, which employs a sophisticated air filtration system, was used to produce biological agents before the Gulf War. UNSCOM destroyed equipment at the facility associated with biological weapons but left other equipment in place. In 2001, without U.N. approval, Baghdad announced that it would renovate the facility to produce vaccine to treat an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, even though it could much more easily and quickly import all the vaccine it needed.

Iraq has greatly expanded the storage capacity of the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, which records show was used to store cultures, agents, and equipment for biological weapons before the Gulf War. Similarly, authorities are rebuilding the Fallujah III Castor Oil Production Facility, which was used to manufacture the deadly agent ricin.

Iraq acknowledged conducting 14 open-air tests of biological weapons from January 1991 to March 1998. At the same time, Baghdad provided no persuasive evidence that it had unilaterally destroyed its biological agents and munitions, as it claimed to have done.

UNSCOM also discovered a document showing that Iraq's Military Industrial Commission wanted to develop mobile fermentation units that could serve as bioweapons laboratories on wheels. A recent defector interviewed by *Vanity Fair* magazine said that he assembled a fleet of Renault trucks — indistinguishable from conventional refrigerator trucks that transport food — outfitted for biological weapons. "They look like meat cars, yogurt cars," he explained. "And inside is a laboratory, with incubators for bacteria, microscopes, air conditioning."

The use — or misuse — of large-scale industrial facilities is only part of the problem. The testimony of a number of defectors, including civil engineers and military officers, suggests that the regime is continuing to disperse biological, chemical, and nuclear facilities in or under civilian sites such as residences, downtown buildings, and some of the more than 40 palaces and luxury residences built for Saddam and his retinue. These are the types of facilities that UNSCOM was unable to investigate before being ordered to leave Iraq.

One defector, Saeed al-Haideri, has described biological and chemical sites located in government companies and private villas — even beneath Saddam Hussein Hospital in Baghdad. Specifically, al-Haideri has alleged that two so-called presidential sites in Radwaniya — from which Iraqi authorities barred U.N. inspectors in 1997 — contained sealed, airtight, underground structures build by a Yugoslav company.

Former UNSCOM chairman Richard Butler observed in a television interview:

The degree of resistance that the Iraqis showed to our investigation of their biological weapons program exceeded all other deceptions and resistances. So I had to conclude that, for Saddam, biological weapons were his weapons of choice. He seems to be really attracted to the idea of killing people with germs, because they tried so hard to keep us away from their biology program.

Going Nuclear

After the Gulf War, the International Atomic Energy Agency succeeded in dismantling 40 nuclear research and development sites in Iraq, including three dedicated to the production of weapons-grade uranium. Not one of these nuclear



An UNSCOM missile team in Baghdad in 1997 was denied access to inspection sites. (AP Photo/Jassim

Mohammed)

facilities was known to the world prior to 1991. Those inspection efforts ended with the forced departure of all IAEA and UNSCOM inspectors in 1998. As a result, no on-the-ground verification of Baghdad's nuclear program has been possible for four years. But the evidence from defectors, purchases of dual-use equipment, and documented efforts to acquire illegal nuclear-related materials on the black market lead to only one conclusion: Iraq's worldwide effort to buy, steal, or develop a nuclear weapon is back in full operation.

Saddam short-circuited his own ambitious nuclear weapons program with his invasion of Kuwait in 1990. During the seven months of occupation, Iraq tried repeatedly to divert highly enriched uranium from its French- and Soviet-built civilian reactors. The Gulf War ended this diversion attempt; but throughout the 1990s, Baghdad withheld data about its nuclear infrastructure, procurement efforts, and weapons designs.

One of the most authoritative looks at Saddam's nuclear ambitions is the former head of Iraq's nuclear program, Khidhir Hamza, who defected in 1994. Hamza has described how Saddam ordered a massive nuclear weapons program in the 1980s, which quickly grew from 500 scientists and technicians to more than 5,000. Hamza has also described the almost routine manner in which the Iraqi regime hid its program from IAEA inspectors:

When the inspectors started arriving, we would just lock the doors to the areas where we were working. We would take the inspectors on a path that was constructed so that we could bypass the locked doors. Behind the locked doors was where we were working to enrich the uranium to design the bomb.

During 2001 and 2002, Baghdad has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes that most

intelligence experts believe are intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium.

A September 2002 report from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that Saddam Hussein could build a nuclear bomb within months if he were able to obtain enriched uranium or other fissile material.

Former Iraqi nuclear director Hamza expressed the same view in a 2000 interview:

I do not know if they have the uranium, but the design is there. The construction would be difficult and probably take a few months. It all depends on how they get the fissile material. Saddam can either start a fissile material program in Iraq — the enrichment program — in which case it may take him two or three years to have it. Or he can get it from abroad, like from Russia. Then he will have it immediately.

Ballistic Missiles and Dual-Use Technology

Iraq has fired ballistic missiles at four states in the region, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain, and Iran. Weapons inspectors have demonstrated that Iraq has the ability to deliver chemical weapons via such missiles.

Iraq has worked strenuously to develop ballistic missiles that exceed the 150-kilometer-range limit established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. To accomplish this, Baghdad has employed the same duplicity that it has used to hide its weapons of mass destruction programs.

At the time of the Gulf War, Baghdad was already developing longer-range missiles based on the technology of the Soviet-designed Scud missiles that Iraqi forces fired in large numbers. After the war, Iraq never fully accounted for its missile program, and discrepancies in its account-



An Iraq al-Hussein Scud missile awaits destruction by U.N. weapons inspectors in the 1990s. (AP Photo/Henry Arvidsson/United Nations)

ing strongly suggest that the armed forces retain a hidden force of Scud-type missiles, as well as launchers, guidance systems, and other components.

In recent years, Iraq has continued to work on two types of short-range ballistic missiles that fall within the 150-kilometer limit established by the United Nations. But there is convincing evidence that Baghdad is working assiduously to violate this limit.

At the Al-Rafah-North Liquid Propellant Engine Facility, the regime is building a test stand for liquid-fuel engines larger than the equipment used for older Scud engine tests. According to the CIA report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs: "The only plausible explanation for this test facility is that Iraq intends to test engines for longer-range missiles prohibited under UNSCR 687."

The same pattern is appearing at two solid rocket-motor facilities at Al-Mustasim and Al-Mamoun, with new or rebuilt structures whose size suggests they will house — and hide — systems prohibited by the United Nations.

According to defectors and other sources, Iraq's goal is to build a ballistic missile capable of carrying chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads with a range of 900 to 1,100 kilometers — sufficient to strike cities in the Gulf and Middle East such as Riyadh, Ankara, Tehran, Amman, Cairo, Alexandria, Tel Aviv, and even Nicosia, Cyprus.

Iraq has continued to explore other means of delivering chemical and biological weapons, notably attempts to convert aircraft into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) equipped with spray tanks that could be loaded with chemical or biological agents.

More broadly, Iraq has been able to import dual-use equipment or simply divert funds from the Oil-for-Food Program to procure equipment that supports its WMD, missile, and conventional weapons programs.

Since December 1999, acting under a new U.N. Security Council resolution, UNMOVIC has been screening Iraqi contracts for goods and services. It found that more than 100 contracts contain provisions for dual-use items that could be diverted into programs for weapons of mass destruction.***

What Does Disarmament Look Like?

INTRODUCTION

On September 12, 2002, President Bush called on the United Nations to live up to its founding purpose and enforce the determination of the international community – expressed in 16 UN Security Council resolutions – that the outlaw Iraqi regime be disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction.

On November 8, the Security Council unanimously passed UNSCR 1441, which gave the Iraqi regime “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” (OP 2). Recognizing that genuine disarmament can only be accomplished through the willing cooperation of the Iraqi regime, the resolution called for the reintroduction of weapons inspectors into Iraq, to test whether or not the regime had made a strategic decision to give up its mass destruction weapons.

The world knows what successful cooperative disarmament looks like. When a country decides to disarm, and to provide to the world verifiable evidence that it has disarmed, there are three common elements to its behavior:

- ◆ The decision to disarm is made at the highest political level;
- ◆ The regime puts in place national initiatives to dismantle weapons and infrastructure; and
- ◆ The regime fully cooperates with international efforts to implement and verify disarmament; its behavior is transparent, not secretive.

Examples of Cooperative Disarmament

In recent years, there have been several notable examples of countries that have chosen to give up mass destruction weapons, and willingly cooperated with the international community to verify its disarmament. These countries include:

- ◆ South Africa
- ◆ Ukraine
- ◆ Kazakhstan

High level Political Commitment

President de Klerk decided in 1989 to end South Africa’s nuclear weapons production and in 1990 to dismantle all weapons. South Africa joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1991 and later that year accepted full scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

Under the leadership of President Kravchuk and President Nazarbayev, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, respectively, ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation and START Treaties. This created high-level political commitments to give up the nuclear weapons and strategic delivery vehicles they inherited upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

National Initiatives to Dismantle Weapons of Mass Destruction

South Africa, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan each charged high-level organizations with implementing disarmament. In South Africa it was the Atomic Energy Commission and ARMSCOR. In Kazakhstan it was primarily the Ministries of Defense and Atomic Energy. In Ukraine it was mainly the Ministry of Defense. Each of these organizations worked cooperatively with outside organizations - for example, the IAEA in South Africa and the United States and Russia in Ukraine and Kazakhstan - to implement disarmament.

Full Cooperation and Transparency

The true measure of cooperation is to answer questions without being asked. In each of these examples, weapons programs were disclosed fully and voluntarily.

South Africa began its disclosure with a declaration to the IAEA on its nuclear program, which was expanded over time. South Africa allowed the IAEA complete access to operating and defunct facilities, provided thousands of

current and historical documents, and allowed detailed, unfettered discussions with personnel involved in the South African program.

An IAEA article from 1994 sums up the cooperative South African approach to nuclear disarmament and IAEA verification:

“In the case of South Africa, the results of extensive inspection and assessment, and the transparency and openness shown, have led to the conclusion that there were no indications to suggest that the initial inventory is incomplete or that the nuclear weapon programme was not completely terminated and dismantled. However, in the future, and without prejudice to the IAEA’s rights under the safeguards agreement, the IAEA plans to take up the standing invitation of the South African Government — under its reiterated policy of transparency — to provide the IAEA with full access to any location or facility associated with the former nuclear weapons program and to grant access, on a case-by-case basis, to other locations or facilities that the IAEA may specifically wish to visit.”

Given the full cooperation of both governments, implementation of the disarmament decision was smooth. All nuclear warheads were returned to Russia by 1996, and all missile silos and heavy bombers were destroyed before the December 2001 START deadline. The United States had full access, beyond Treaty requirements, to confirm silo and bomber destruction, which were done with U.S. assistance.

Both countries have also gone farther in disarmament than the NPT and START Treaty require. For example, Kazakhstan no longer has strategic missiles and Ukraine is well on the way to giving up its strategic missiles. Ukraine asked for U.S. assistance to destroy its Backfire bombers and also air-launched cruise missiles.

In the early 1990s, Kazakhstan revealed to us a stockpile of more than 500 kg. of HEU, and asked that we remove it to safety in the United States. It has also shut down its plutonium-producing reactor and is

using U.S. assistance to ensure the long-term safe storage of the spent fuel. Finally, Kazakhstan used U.S. assistance to destroy all nuclear test tunnels and bore holes — a total of almost 200 — at the former Soviet test site there.

Iraqi Non-Cooperation

The behavior of the Iraqi regime contrasts sharply with successful disarmament examples.

Instead of high-level commitment to disarm, highly organized concealment efforts, staffed by thousands of Iraqis, are led from the very top of the Iraqi regime.

- ◆ Iraq's concealment activities are run by the Special Security Organization (SSO), under the control of Qusay Saddam Hussein, Saddam Hussein's son.

Instead of charging organizations to work with outside groups to disarm, the regime tasks key institutions with thwarting the inspectors.

- ◆ The National Monitoring Directorate — whose stated function is to facilitate inspections — actually serves as an “anti-inspections” organization that:
 - ◆ Provides tip-offs to inspection sites; and
 - ◆ Uses “minders” to intimidate witnesses.
 - ◆ The minders are often former engineers and scientists with direct WMD experience, and first-hand knowledge of what needs to be protected protected from the inspectors when they arrive at a facility.
- ◆ Thousands of personnel from Iraqi security agencies provide manpower for hiding documents and materiel from inspectors, policing inspection sites, and monitoring the inspectors' activities.
- ◆ Such organizations include the Military Industrialization Organization, the SSO, the Special Division for Baghdad Security, the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), the

Special Republican Guard, the Republican Guard, and the Directorate of General Security.

- ◆ These “anti-inspectors” vastly outnumber the 200 UNMOVIC and the IAEA personnel on the ground in Iraq.

Instead of cooperation and transparency Iraq has chosen to conceal and to lie.

- ◆ Iraq's declaration is not “currently accurate, full, and complete.” It is inaccurate and incomplete.

Anthrax and Other Undeclared Biological Agents

- ◆ The UN Special Commission concluded that Iraq did not verifiably account for, at a minimum, 2160kg of growth media. This is enough to produce 26,000 liters of anthrax — 3 times the amount Iraq declared; 1200 liters of botulinum toxin; and, 2200 liters of aflatoxin, a carcinogen.

Ballistic Missiles

- ◆ Iraq has declared its attempt to manufacture missile fuels suited only to a type of missile which Iraq's declaration does not admit to developing.
- ◆ Iraq claims that its designs for a larger diameter missile fall within the UN-mandated 150km limit. But Dr. Blix has cited 13 recent Iraqi missile tests which exceed the 150km limit.

Nuclear Weapons

- ◆ The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from abroad.

VX

- ◆ In 1999, UN Special Commission and international experts concluded that Iraq needed

to provide additional, credible information about VX production. UNSCOM concluded that Iraq had not accounted for 1.5 tons of VX, a powerful nerve agent. Former UNSCOM head Richard Butler wrote that “a missile warhead of the type Iraq has made and used can hold some 140 liters of VX . . . A single such warhead would contain enough of the chemical to kill up to 1 million people.”

- ◆ The declaration provides no information to address these concerns.

Chemical and Biological Weapons Munitions

- ◆ In January 1999, the UN Special Commission reported that Iraq failed to provide credible evidence that 550 mustard gas-filled artillery shells and 400 biological weapon-capable aerial bombs had been lost or destroyed.
- ◆ The Iraqi regime has never adequately accounted for hundreds, possibly thousands, of tons of chemical precursors.

Empty Chemical Munitions

- ◆ There is no adequate accounting for nearly 30,000 empty munitions that could be filled with chemical agents.
- ◆ If one of those shells were filled with the nerve agent Sarin, which Iraq is known to have produced, it would contain over 40,000 lethal doses.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Programs

- ◆ Iraq denies any connection between UAV programs and chemical or biological agent dispersal. Yet, Iraq admitted in 1995 that a MIG-21 remote-piloted vehicle tested in 1991 was intended to carry a biological weapon spray system.
- ◆ Iraq already knows how to put these biological agents into

bombs and how to disperse biological agent using aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles.

Mobile Biological Weapons Agent Facilities

- ◆ The Iraqi declaration provides no information about its mobile biological weapon agent facilities.
- ◆ Iraq continues its tactics of “cheat and retreat” that defeated prior inspections efforts, and Iraq continues its efforts to hide prohibited WMD programs.
- ◆ This fall, satellite photos revealed activity at several suspected WMD facilities, apparently in anticipation of the resumption of inspections.
- ◆ We have multiple reports of the intensified efforts to hide documents in spaces considered unlikely to be found, such as private homes of low level officials and universities. On January 16, 2003, a joint UNMOVIC/IAEA team found a significant cache of documents related to Iraq’s uranium enrichment program in the home of Iraqi scientist Faleh Hassan.
- ◆ We have many reports of WMD material being buried, concealed in lakes, relocated to agricultural areas and private homes, or hidden beneath Mosques or hospitals. In one report such material was buried in the banks of the Tigris river during a low water period. Furthermore, according to these reports, the material is moved constantly, making it difficult to trace or to find without absolutely fresh intelligence.
- ◆ The regime routinely conducts well-organized surveillance of inspectors.
- ◆ The SSO tracks the number, expertise, equipment, vehicles, location, and heading of inspectors.

- ◆ Iraq has in the past used, and is likely again to use, cyber attack methods in its efforts to collect intelligence.
- ◆ Computer systems used to store, process, or communicate UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection schedules, methods, criteria, or findings will be particularly high-value targets.
- ◆ At a minimum, Iraq can apply tools and methods readily available from publicly accessible Internet sources, many of which are quite effective and require only moderate skill to implement.
- ◆ According to Iraqi defector Dr. Khidhir Hamza, Iraq’s Babylon Software Company was developing cyber warfare capabilities on behalf of the Iraqi Intelligence Service as early as the 1990s. People assigned to Babylon initially worked on information security technologies and techniques, but some of the programmers were segregated into a “highly compartmented unit” and tasked with breaking into foreign computers in order to download sensitive data or infect the computers with viruses. Some of the programmers reported that they had accumulated enough expertise to break into moderately protected computer systems.
- ◆ Yet the Iraqis accuse the inspectors of being spies – the gravest accusation that a totalitarian government can make.
- ◆ In mid-January Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan said “We know they [the inspectors] are playing an intelligence role. The way they are conducting their inspections and the sites they are visiting have nothing to do with weapons of mass destruction. But we are cooperating with inspection teams in a positive way in order to expose the lies of those who have bad intentions.”

- ◆ Iraq has not provided “immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to witnesses.”
- ◆ Instead inspectors have been expected to interview Iraqis with minders under unsecure conditions.
- ◆ The regime has resisted allowing interviews outside the country.
- ◆ Iraq’s list of WMD scientists together with their associated work places and dates ends in 1991 although UNSCOM proved that the programs did not.
- ◆ Iraq refuses to provide key documents, some of which have been demanded by inspectors for years.
- ◆ Iraq has impeded the inspectors’ demand to begin aerial surveillance.

Conclusion

Iraq’s behavior contrasts sharply with successful disarmament stories.

Instead of a high-level commitment to disarm, Iraq’s concealment efforts are led by Saddam’s son Qusay. The inspectors are labeled spies and treated as the enemy, not as a partner in disarmament.

Instead of national initiatives to disarm, Iraq’s SSO and National Monitoring Directorate are national programs involving thousands of people to target inspectors and thwart their duties.

Instead of cooperation and transparency, Iraq has chosen concealment and deceit best exemplified by a 12,000 page declaration which is far from “currently accurate, full, and complete,” as required by the United Nations Security Council.***

Pictures In Review

PUBLIC AFFAIRS SECTION SPONSORS TV TRAINING

Television crews from all of the TV stations in Ghana participated in a week long workshop, January 6 - 10, 2003, on TV News Broadcasting led by Dr. Sam Swan of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, College of Communications. With over 30 years in broadcasting, broadcast management, broadcast education, and research, Dr. Swan shared his wealth of experience with an enthusiastic group of Ghanaian TV professionals. The workshop focused on all aspects of TV news production from defining news and generating story ideas to interviewing tips and effective camera techniques. The week culminated in a mock news broadcast using stories that had been developed and shot by the participants. Participants left the workshop



energized and motivated to incorporate what they learned into their future programs.

Photos: Top is Dr. Sam Swan explaining some points to one of the participants. (Middle left), at the opening ceremony Mr. Prince Hari Crystal of Crystal TV, Kumasi introduces himself to his colleagues. (Right), Ms. Emma Morrison and Ms. Korkor Ocansey in mock news broadcast. (Below left), Group picture of participants and Dr. Sam Swan at the close of the workshop. With them are Ms. Mary Daschbach, Information Officer of the Embassy, and Ms. Zainab Mahama, Information Specialist.***

ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION WORKSHOP FOR GHANAIAN LEGAL OFFICIALS

The US Embassy Public Affairs Section and the Center for African Peace and Conflict Resolution at Cal State - Sacramento held Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) workshops for lawyers, judges, and court reporters in January in preparation for the court system's formal adoption of court-centered ADR in April. Eight Supreme Court Justices participated. The US Embassy has supported the development of alternate dispute resolution in Ghana since the summer of 1996 when three Ghanaian legal officials received training under a Citizens' Exchange Program. In the intervening six years, training sessions through the ten regions of Ghana has led to a thriving

community ADR center, ADR service at the Legal Resources Center in Nima, a mediation service at the Ghana-American Chamber of Commerce, and the training of ADR trainers within a number of Ghanaian institutions including those serving problem families, homeless and poor, and women and children.

ADR took a giant leap forward after two Citizens' Exchange participants were nominated to the Supreme Court last fall. They lectured on ADR at Ghana's annual bar association meetings and advocated ADR to decongest the court system during their confirmation hearings. Chief Justice Wiredu has appointed an ADR task force to develop the framework for court-

*centered dispute resolution. The courts will start ADR work in April. With the active leadership of the Court, alternate dispute resolution can speed up the resolution of disputes, ease the case backlog, streamline commercial dispute resolution, and promote respect for the law. Photo: (From left to right), Cultural Affairs Officer John Dyson, Cal State Professor Ernest Uwazie, Justice George Acquah, Justice Sophia Akuffo.****



U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: A NEW ERA

Bibliography and Key Internet Sites

Please note that the U.S. Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below; such responsibility resides solely with the providers.

U.S. Government Sites

U.S. Commission on National Security
<http://www.nssg.gov/>

U.S. Department of State:
International Information Programs:
International Security
<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/>

U.S. National Security Council
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/>

U.S. National Security Council.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Washington: Government Printing Office, September 2002. 35p.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>

U.S. President: Policies in Focus:
National Security
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/response/index.html>

Articles

Gaddis, John Lewis. A GRAND STRATEGY OF TRANSFORMATION (*Foreign Policy*, no. 133, November/December 2002, pp. 50-57)
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_novdec_2002/gaddis.html

Hirsh, Michael. BUSH AND THE WORLD (*Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 5, September/October 2002, pp. 18-44)
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/hirsh0902.html>

Kissinger, Henry. PREEMPTION AND THE END OF WESTPHALIA (*New Perspectives Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 4, Fall 2002, pp. 31-36)
http://www.npq.org/archive/2002_fall/kissinger.html

Kucia, Christine. COUNTERPROLIFERATION AT CORE OF NEW SECURITY STRATEGY (*Arms Control Today*, vol. 32, no. 8, October 2002, p. 30)
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_10/secstrategyoct02.asp

O'Hanlon, Michael; Rice, Susan; Steinberg, James B. *THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND PREEMPTION.*
Washington: Brookings Institution,

November 14, 2002. 11p.
<http://www.brook.edu/views/papers/ohanlon/20021114.htm>

Rice, Condoleezza. ANTICIPATORY DEFENSE IN THE WAR ON TERROR (*New Perspectives Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 4, Fall 2002, pp. 5-8)
http://www.npq.org/archive/2002_fall/rice.html

Spencer, Jack. *THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: AN EFFECTIVE BLUEPRINT FOR THE WAR ON TERROR.* Washington: The Heritage Foundation, September 25, 2002.
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/WM149.cfm>

UPCOMING TRADE EVENTS IN THE U.S.

International Buyer Program (IBP) Trips:

Event Name: **Int'l Franchisee, Expo**
Event Date: April 11-13, 2003
Industry Theme: Franchising.
Type of Event: Franchising
Location: Washington DC
Recruiter's
Name: Roland Adade
Tel: (233) (21) 679 751-4 or 679756
Fax: (233) (21) 679756
Email: Roland.Adade@mail.doc.gov

Event Name: **Restaurant, Hotel, Motel show (NRA)**
Event Date: May 17-20, 2003
Industry Theme: Tourism-Rest. Hotel and Kitchen Equip.
Type of Event: International Buyer Program
Location: Chicago IL
Recruiter's
Name: Roland Adade
Tel: (233) (21) 679 751-4 or 679756
Fax: (233) (21) 679756
Email: Roland.Adade@mail.doc.gov

Event Name: **Supercomm 2003**
Event Date: June 1-5, 2003
Industry Theme: IT
Type of Event: International Buyer Program
Location: Atlanta, GA
Recruiter's
Name: Roland Adade
TEL: (233) (21) 679 751-4
FAX: (233) (21) 679756/776008
Email: Roland.Adade@mail.doc.gov

Event Name: **Waste Expo 2003**
Event Date: June 3-5, 2003
Industry Theme: Environmental Technologies
Type of Event: International Buyer Program
Location: New Orleans, LA
Recruiter's
Name: Esther Adielson-Addo
TEL: 233 21 679 751
FAX: 233 21 679 756
Email: Esther.Adielson-Addo@mail.doc.gov

Event Name: **MAGIC Int'l**
Event Date: August 25-28, 2003
Industry Theme: Fashion
Type of Event: International Buyer Program
Location: Las Vegas
Recruiter's
Name: Esther Adielson-Addo
Tel: (233) (21) 679 751-4
Fax: (233) (21) 679756/776008
Email: Esther.Adielson-Addo@mail.doc.gov

Event Name: **NAFEM 03**
Event Date: September 5-8, 2003
Industry Theme: Food Equipment
Type of Event: International Buyer Program
Location: New Orleans LA
Recruiter's
Name: Roland Adade
Tel: (233) (21) 679751-4
Fax: (233) (21) 679756/ 776008
Email: Roland.Adade@mail.doc.gov

Event Name: **Medtrade**
Event Date: October 29-31, 2002
Industry Theme: Medical
Type of Event: International Buyer Program
Location: Atlanta, GA
Recruiter's
Name: Esther Adielson-Addo
Tel: (233) (21) 679751-4
Fax: (233) (21) 679756/ 776008
Email: Esther.Adielson-Addo@mail.doc.gov

Event Name: **Pack Expo**
Event Date: November 3-7, 2002
Industry Theme: Packing and Food Processing
Type of Event: International Buyer Program
Location: Chicago, IL
Recruiter's
Name: Roland Adade
Tel: (233) (21) 679751-4
Fax: (233) (21) 235096/ 776008
Email: Roland.Adade@mail.doc.gov

For information on other trade shows in the United States in 2003, please visit www.usatrade.gov/ibp/events.htm

For more information on these tradeshows, please visit their respective websites. You may contact the U.S. Commercial Service for further information on participating in these tradeshows.

**U.S. Commercial Service
Public Affairs Section**
P.O. Box 194
Accra

Tel: 021-679751-4
Fax: 021-679756
Email: Office_BoxEsther.Adielson_Addo@mail.doc.gov

